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Abstract 
Recently introduced corporate governance codes and guidelines in Europe have emphasized 
the importance of appointing independent directors to lead organizations’ boards. Many 
commentators and institutional investors believe that independent directors are particularly effective 
in controlling the actions of CEOs by pushing them to make decisions to improve firm performance 
and firm growth. This issue is especially relevant in the public utility industry where the 
maximization of profit is only one of many interests that must be satisfied. Using a unique financial 
and governance dataset from European public utilities, we studied whether the presence of 
independent directors and other board variables correlates with firm performance and firm growth. 
We found evidence that independent directors do not influence present and future firm 
performance, and firm growth. Executive directors impact positively both present and future firm 
performance. Our results challenge corporate governance codes’ conventional wisdom that a larger 
number of independents in board composition improves firm results. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent corporate scandals and the financial crisis have focused attention on the issue of 
corporate governance. As researchers, business people, and politicians have examined 
elements influencing firm performance, renewed scrutiny has been given to the role and 
structure of boards of directors. 
There is considerable literature on the impact of the composition of boards of directors. 
According to the classical principal-agent framework (Fama, 1980), shareholders want 
managers to work in their best interests—that is, to maximize their wealth. However, 
managers may make decisions based on poor business acumen, such as the selection of 
suboptimal investments, or self-interest. In this context, governance structure and board 
composition can be used as tools to monitor managers and reduce agency costs.  
A number of corporate governance mechanisms have been proposed to ameliorate the 
principal-agent problem. These mechanisms include a smaller board size, more outsiders on 
the board, more board meetings, a higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity, higher 
managerial ownership, higher institutional ownership, and stronger shareholder rights. Many 
studies (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Yermack, 1996; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 
2003) suggest that changing these governance instruments would lead managers to better 
align their interests with those of their shareholders, resulting in a higher firm value.  
One such mechanism that deserves increased scrutiny is the role of independent 
directors. Independent directors are directors without affiliations with the company (i.e. not 
current employees, without business or relatives relationships with the company). The 
common assumption is that independent directors are particularly effective at reducing agency 
costs and increasing shareholder wealth by using their experience to understand which 
decisions would improve firm performance and then directing managers to implement those 
decisions. According to this view, boards controlled by independents can positively influence 
firm performance. Some studies have found better stock returns and operating outcomes when 
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outside directors held a significant percentage of board seats (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992). On the other hand, recent research shows that the presence of 
independents may have no effect or even reduce firm performance. Yermack (1996), Core et 
al. (1999), Bhagat and Black (2000), Fernandes (2008), and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan 
(2008) document that firms with more independent directors do not have better performance 
than other firms. One reason could be related to the problem of asymmetric information. 
Independent directors make decisions based on information they receive from CEOs and other 
executive directors, who may provide only partial information or information that supports 
the executives’ previously established positions. Without external mechanisms to incentivize 
independent directors to improve firm performance (such as reputation, monetary incentives, 
threat of dismissal, etc), board independence alone may be an ineffective tool for good firm 
results.  
Of these previous studies, many have focused on industrial sectors. However, public 
utility companies until now have been overlooked, despite possessing characteristics that 
provide an interesting context in which to analyze the efficacy of independent directors. 
Public utility companies work in a regulated environment1, in which the maximization of 
profit is only one element that must be satisfied. Moreover, since in most countries directors 
of public utilities are also politicians, their incentive to act upon different stakeholders’ 
interests (i.e. satisfaction of interests of political parties, control of some industries, reduction 
of unemployment level, development of a specific geographical area, etc.) rather than 
shareholders’ interests can become a concern. While the strong presence of the “Political 
                                                
1 European law distinguishes public utility industries in different segments, each of them caracterizes by a 
different market regulation. In particular there are some segments in which more competitors are allowed (in 
market competition) and others in which the nature of assets required (network) and the impossibility to 
duplicate them don’t permit the presence of more than a competitor for each geographical area. This monopoly 
market structure is regulated by the “competition for the market” model. In this kind of segments, public utilities 
offers services of general interest, according to the definition given by the European Commission. Because of 
these caracteristics these segments are regulated in order to guarantee an “efficient and non-discriminatory 
services” supplying. Despite this distinction, many public utility companies, and first of all energy ones, are 
involved in different businesses and/or in different segments of these businesses at the same time. 
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Hand” may favor rent expropriation by directors-politicians, both the pressure of public 
opinion on politicians and governance mechanisms can serve as limiting factors (Barontini, 
Bozzi, 2011).  
In this context, the role of independent directors in public utilities is more relevant and 
controversial than in other sectors, even as their empirical impact remains unclear. This article 
evaluates the effect of the presence of independent directors upon firm performance and firm 
growth for listed public utility firms within the energy sector. Specifically, we analyze public 
utilities’ governance characteristics in Italy, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom from 
2002 to 2009. 
We chose to study a single industry since, as Gertner and Kaplan (1996) argue, optimal 
governance may differ across industries, making it difficult to identify the effect of 
governance on performance. Similar arguments have been put forth by Romano (1996) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).  
Consistent with previous studies in corporate governance, we examined the relationship 
between the independent directors in the board and firm performance. To proxy firm 
performance we use three measures: Tobin’s Q, Market Capitalization and Ebit. We further 
examined how the inclusion of independent directors affects the growth of the firm.  
This paper contributes to existing literature on multiple levels. Although this topic has 
been studied widely, in our knowledge there has been no empirical analysis of regulated 
public utilities in Europe. Due to the difficulties involved with collecting corporate 
governance data, prior research has focused primarily on companies within the United States. 
In addition, the time period we selected was characterized by the introduction of new ways to 
compete and structure the boards of public utility companies.  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 describes 
the data and the estimation methodology; Section 4 presents the empirical results; and Section 
5 offers our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
In recent years, the value of outside and independent directors has been one of the most 
widely discussed questions regarding boards. This discussion has paralleled the introduction 
of new corporate governance codes in Europe that, in turn, have led to an increase in the 
number of independent directors. This pattern reflects the common view that one of the 
principal responsibilities of a board is to monitor management, and independent directors—
unhindered by internal politics and allegiances—are better able to execute this task.  
In academic literature, however, the effects of the presence of independent directors in 
the board are ambiguous. Some existing literature has examined contemporaneous 
correlations between accounting measures of performance and the proportion of outside 
directors on the board, analyzing the issue by considering outsiders as controllers of executive 
actions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), 
Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2000) studied relationships between accounting 
performance measures and the fraction of outside and independent directors on boards within 
U.S. companies, reporting no significant results. Another approach, suggested by the work of 
Morck et al. (1988), is to use Tobin’s Q as a performance measure in order to reflect the 
“value added” of intangible factors such as governance. Using this method, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) found no noticeable relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and Tobin’s Q. Instead, when Bhagat and Black (2000) examined the effect of board 
composition on long-term stock market and accounting performance, they found that a larger 
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number of independents in board composition not only did not improve but may actually 
reduce firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) in turn offered a possible 
explanation by suggesting that poor performance may lead to an increase in the number of 
independents in board composition. If true, in a cross-section independent directors would 
appear at a disadvantage since they would be disproportionately associated with firms with 
historically poor performance.  
All the empirical studies discussed above considered companies within the United 
States. However, results can vary based on the country selected. Krivogorsky (2006), Garcia-
Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2006), and Lefort and Urzùa (2008) found, respectively, that for 
continental European firms listed in the United States, Spain, and Chile, the relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on the board and accounting performance 
was positive and statistically significant.  
This research offers an interesting perspective when analyzing the effect of independent 
directors on firm results within the public utility sector. While directors should make 
decisions in order to maximize both their shareholders’ and consumers’ wealth, the public 
pressure they may face as politicians could similarly influence their effect on firm results.  
 
 
3. Methodology and data  
As discussed above, though most empirical studies consider U.S. companies, 
Krivogorsky (2006), Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2006), and Lefort and Urzùa (2008) 
analyzed continental European firms listed in the United States, Spain, and Chile and found a 
positive relationship between independent directors on the boards and firms’ performances. 
These results may be stronger when we consider regulated markets and, in particular, public 
utilities. According to the definition given by the European Commission, public utility 
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companies offer services of general interest. In other words, they should provide “efficient 
and non-discriminatory service.” According to this view, they should consider social welfare 
but, since they are listed firms, they also must guarantee an appropriate shareholders’ return. 
In addition, since most directors of public utilities are politicians or are appointed by 
politicians, public pressure can push them to satisfy first other stakeholders’ interests rather 
then shareholders’ interests. Moreover, since independent directors have not affiliations with 
the company, they are particularly effective at reducing agency costs and increasing 
shareholder wealth by using their experience to understand which decisions would improve 
firm performance and then directing managers to implement those decisions. This argument 
leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between independent directors and firm performance 
(present and future) in public utilities is positive. 
   
Since independent directors should monitor CEOs’ and executive directors’ actions and 
guarantee firm growth in the long run, we also expect a positive relationship between a larger 
number of independents in board composition and firm growth. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of independent directors on the board has a significant 
positive relationship with firm growth. 
 
We collected evidence on 43 listed public utility companies within the energy sector in 
Italy, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The panel was based on 344 year-observations 
for the period from 2002 to 2009. Data was collected from different sources. Financial data 
came from the Datastream-Worldscope database, which contains historical financial data on 
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the world’s leading public companies. The uniqueness of our dataset comes from the 
governance data. In particular, data about board structure and board composition were hand-
collected by downloading the annual corporate governance reports of each company.   
Consistent with previous research, we examined the effect of independent directors on 
measures of firm performance measured with Tobin’s Q, Market Capitalization and Ebit. We 
measure firm growth as the difference between the logarithm of total assets at the end of the 
year and the logarithm of total assets of the previous years. We followed the common practice 
of dividing directors into inside directors (current officers in the company), outside directors 
(not current employees but likely to have business relationships with the company, such as 
investment bankers and lawyers; officers in the recent past; or relatives of employees), and 
independent directors (outside directors without such affiliations). We included a dummy 
variable to indicate whether the CEO also was the Chairman since it is argued that the power 
concentration of a joint CEO/Chairman could impede the supervisory ability of the board and, 
therefore, separation of these roles is good governance.  
The regressions were controlled for board size, years, countries, and sectors (divided 
into gas, electricity, and multi-utilities that also provide energy). Since we had a panel of 
firms with data both across firms and over time, we use the fixed effect method. This 
methodology allowed us to control for the unobserved firm effects that influence the 
dependent variable (present and future firm performance and firm growth) and cannot be 
measured.  
The models we tested are: 
 
               
(1) 
Performanceit = !1Independentit +!2Executiveit +!3Bsizeit +!4CEOdualityit +!5Xit +"it
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(2) 
 
Where is firm performance measured with three different proxies: 
Tobin’s Q, the logarithmic transformation of market capitalization and the logarithmic 
transformation of Ebit. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio of the market value of equity minus 
book value of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets (Palia, 2001); 
market capitalization is calculated as Market Price-Fiscal Period End * Common Shares 
Outstanding; Ebit is earning before taxes and interests and it is calculated by taking the pre-
tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. 
and are, respectively, the number of independent and executive 
directors on the board; is the total number of directors on the board; is a 
dummy to indicate whether the CEO is also the Chairman; and  reflects dummies for 
years, countries and sectors. Using equation (1) we tested the first hypothesis about the 
relationship between independent directors and present firm performance. Using equation (2) 
we tested the relationship between independent directors and future firm performance. 
The second hypothesis considered the following model: 
 
              (3) 
 
Where is the firm growth rate, measured as the difference between 
the logarithm of total assets at time t and the logarithm of total assets at time t-1. 
As mentioned above, the estimation method used was fixed effect; we selected this 
method since it is possible to control for many unobservable or difficult-to-measure firm 
Performanceit = !1Independentit!1 +!2Executiveit!1 +!3Bsizeit!1 +!4CEOdualityit!1 +!5Xit!1 +"it!1
Performanceit
Independentit Executiveit
itBsize CEOdualityit
itX
AnnualGrowtRateit = !1Independentit!1 +!2Executiveit!1 +!3Bsizeit!1 +!4CEOdualityit!1 +!5Xit +"it
AnnualGrowthRateit
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characteristics and omitted variables that often affect this kind of model. The results are 
shown in the next section. 
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the governance variables and financial data in the 
sample. Descriptive statistics for each country and the correlation matrix are presented in 
appendices A and B, respectively. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section reports the results of the relationship between board variables and firm 
performance and firm growth. The regressions contain indicator variables that control for the 
years, the countries, and the sectors (divided into gas, electricity, and multi-utilities that also 
provide energy). 
Table 2 presents the effect of independent directors on firm performance measured as 
Tobin’s Q, market capitalization and Ebit. Controlling for board size, the results show that 
independent directors do not affect present firm performance and the relationship is not 
statistically significant. Indeed, executive directors have a positive effect on firm 
performance, as Tobin’s Q, market capitalization and Ebit are considered. We include in the 
model CEO duality that is a dummy that assume 1 if the CEO is also Chairman. We find that 
this variable is positive and statistically significant, meaning that when CEO is also Chairman 
the firm performance is higher.  
In the table 3, we test whether the presence of independent directors impacts future firm 
performance. We test the model considered lagged board variables. Also in this case, the 
independent directors variable is not statistically significant. Consistent with previous studies 
about U.S. companies, in European public utilities the presence of independents does not 
affect future firm performance. One interpretation of these results is that a larger number of 
independents in the board composition alone does not mean better present and future 
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performance. Having more independent directors do not lead to an increase in the firm 
performance. This means that their effectiveness does not depend on the number of 
independent directors in the boardroom. To increase their effectiveness, it could be necessary, 
for example, to strength the incentives that they have, such as stronger incentive 
compensation schemes or a higher reputation effect. Moreover, the results in the table 3 show 
also that executive directors affect positively future firm performance measured as market 
capitalization. The relationship is not statistically significant when Ebit and Tobin’s Q proxy 
firm performance. The interpretation of this result is that also in the public utilities executive 
directors pay more attention of stock market results than accounting measures.  
In the table 4, we tested the effect of independent directors on firm growth. Since firm 
growth is measured as the difference between the logarithm of total assets at time t and the 
logarithm of total assets at time t-1, the board variable also should be lagged at time t-1. 
Again the results show that the presence of independent directors does not affect firm growth; 
however, executive directors and CEO duality do influence firm growth. Specifically, an 
increase in the number of executive directors leads to a reduction of firm growth.  
Again, independent directors do not influence growth rate but executive directors affect 
it. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Corporate governance—and, in particular, board composition and the role of independent 
directors—has been a topic of much attention lately. Although this recent scrutiny is 
particularly topical due to well-publicized governance failures and subsequent regulatory 
changes, corporate governance is an area of longstanding interest. Corporations have an 
enormous share of economic activity in modern economies, and the cost of their agency 
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problems and the effect of their corporate governance characteristics are issues of 
fundamental importance. Regulated sectors, such as that of public utilities, have an additional 
significance since they provide a service of general interest: they have to pay attention to 
consumers’ wealth but, contemporaneously, they have to guarantee an appropriate 
shareholders’ return. It is not surprising that in recent years most European countries have 
introduced corporate governance codes providing guidelines to improve firm results. 
According to these codes, the presence of independent directors on agency boards is a tool to 
reduce organizational costs and improve firm results.  
This paper establishes the effects of board variables on firm performance and firm 
growth, focusing on the role of independent directors. Similar to previous studies on 
companies within the United States, we find that independent directors do not influence—
rather than increase–firm performance. Specifically, we observe no evidence that more 
independent boards achieve better firm performance and higher firm growth. We find, 
instead, that executive directors on firms’ boards increase present and future firm 
performance. Our results thus do not support the conventional wisdom that a larger number of 
independents in the board composition improves firm performance. 
One of the reasons, explored in the second section, could be related to the problem of 
asymmetric information (Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). By definition, independents 
are directors who are not affiliated with the company through past or present business 
relationships or related to employees. They therefore have limited knowledge about the 
company and are reliant on information they receive from the CEO and other executive 
directors to make decisions. Because the information received may be influenced by its source 
and filtered to better support the decisions of the CEO or executives, the independent 
directors’ lack of comprehensive information could reduce their effectiveness of monitoring. 
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Another possibility is that some directors who are classified as independent are not truly 
independent because they are beholden to the company or the company’s current CEO may 
exert too much influence on board decisions. For example, some nominally independent 
directors may be employed by a foundation that receives financial support from the company, 
or some directors may have personal relationships with the CEO that affect their 
independence. Unfortunately, the data needed to capture these relationships are not available.  
A third explanation is that independent directors need to be better incentivized. Creating 
remuneration schemes that push them to increase firm performance could be an instrument 
that would tie board independence to firm results. Reputation also could provide an incentive 
for independent directors. Yermack (2004) shows that when firms perform well, the 
likelihood of obtaining new directorships increases so dramatically that it incentivizes 
independents. According to him, reputation is one of the strongest motivators for independent 
directors.  
More research is needed to explore these avenues and to evaluate whether value could 
be added through other board variables, such as an increase in the number of inside directors. 
An extension of our study also could consider other measures of firm performance (e.g., using 
accounting profitability ratios) or add other governance variables, such as the percentage of 
shares owned by directors or dummies for politically connected directors. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs     
1. Board size 10.68      3.82 3 23 271 
2. Number of 
independent directors 5.30 3.16  0 16 250 
3. Number of 
executive directors 2.28    1.53          0 9 255 
4. Number of 
independent directors 
scaled by board size 0.49 0.24 0 0.89 250 
5. Number of 
executive directors 
scaled by board size 0.25 0.21 0 1 255 
6. CEO duality 0.30 0.46           0 1 265 
7. Total Assets 2.21*107 3.77*107 152.85 2.39*108 312 
8. Market 
capitalization 1.30 107     2.09*107 4334 1.48*108 284 
9. Ebit 1669705 3537066 -6030904 2.74*107 309 
11. Tobin’s Q 1.36    0.67 0.39 8.14 281 
12. Annual Firm 
Growth Rate 0.10 1.06 -6.20 7.12 301 
Board Size is the number of members in the boardroom. CEO duality is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
Chairman, 0 otherwise. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus 
the book value of assets to the book value of assets. Market capitalization is calculated as Market Price-Fiscal Period End * 
Common Shares Outstanding. Ebit is Earning before taxes and interests and it is calculated by taking the pre-tax income and 
adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. Annual Firm Growth Rate is the difference between 
the logarithm of total assets at time t and the logarithm of total assets at time t-1.  
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TABLE 2 
Effects of board composition on present firm performance in the public utilities in 
Europe (years 2000-2009) 
 Tobin’sQ Log(Mktcap) L(Ebit) ROA 
Independent directors  -0.09 0.03 0.02 1.10 
  (-0.57) (0.93) (0.72) (1.02) 
Executive directors  0.04* 0.10*** 0.12*** -1.42 
  (1.73) (2.94) (2.80) (-0.64) 
Board Size 0.01 -0.01 0.19 -0.90 
  (0.89) (-0.67) (0.67) (-0.98) 
CEO duality 0.16*** 0.33*** 0.32 0.21 
  (3.84) (3.02) (1.36) (0.06) 
_cons 0.83*** 14.71*** 12.42*** 10.95 
  (3.05) (6.94) (4.02) (0.96) 
Years-dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R-squared 0.19 0.56 0.32 0.05 
F-statistic 17.87 16.38 13.56 0.74 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 
The table shows fixed effect regressions. Standard errors are cluster. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** 
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All regressions include year dummies. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets. 
Log(Mktcap) is the logarithmic transformation of market capitalization, calculated as Market Price-Fiscal Period End * 
Common Shares Outstanding. Log(Ebit) is the logarithmic transformation of Earning before taxes and interests and it is 
calculated by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. ROA is 
return on asset for the year and it is equal to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest 
Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s Total Assets * 100.  
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TABLE 3 
Effects of board composition on future firm performance in the public utilities in 
Europe (years 2000-2009) 
 Tobin’sQ Log(MarketCap) L(Ebit) ROA 
Independent directors t-1  -0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.03 
  (-1.21) (1.00) -(0.61) (0.15) 
Executive directors t-1 0.01 0.07*** 0.10 0.57 
  (0.67) (2.03) (1.56) (0.59) 
Board Size t-1 0.60 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.89) (-2.05) (0.62) (-0.04) 
CEO duality t-1 0.02 0.30*** 0.22 0.03 
  (0.57) (3.50) (1.33) (0.05) 
_cons 1.18*** 15.04*** 12.83*** 0.35 
  (14.77) (11.33) (4.28) (0.06) 
Years-dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R-squared 0.30 0.61 0.36 0.04 
F-statistic 17.76 16.82 14.24 2.49 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
The table shows fixed effect regressions. Standard errors are cluster. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** 
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All regressions include year dummies. Independent variables are 
lagged. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus the book value 
of assets to the book value of assets. Log(Mktcap) is the logarithmic transformation of market capitalization, calculated as 
Market Price-Fiscal Period End * Common Shares Outstanding. Log(Ebit) is the logarithmic transformation of Earning 
before taxes and interests and it is calculated by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and 
subtracting interest capitalized. ROA is return on asset for the year and it is equal to (Net Income before Preferred Dividends 
+ ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s Total Assets 
* 100.  
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TABLE 4 
Effects of board composition on firm growth in the public utilities in Europe (years 
2000-2009) 
 Annual Growth Rate 
Independent directors t-1 0.03 0.03 
  (0.58) (0.50) 
Executive directors t-1 -0.28*** -0.30*** 
  (-2.79) (-3.31) 
Board Size t-1 -0.08 -0.09* 
  (-1.52) (-1.82) 
CEO duality t-1 -0.60*** -0.36 
  (-2.00) (-1-29) 
_cons 1.66*** 1.70*** 
  (3.41) (3.18) 
State-owned  0.08 
  (0.15) 
   
Years-dummy Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
   
R-squared 0.13 0.12 
F-statistic 2.49 1.93 
Prob>F 0.00 0.03 
The table shows fixed effect regressions. Standard errors are cluster. T-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** 
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All regressions include year dummies. Independent variables are 
lagged. Annual Growth Rate is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of total assets at time t and the logarithm of 
total assets at time t-1. State-owned is a dummy that it is equal to 1 if the company is controlled by a state or a municipality. 
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APPENDIX A  
Descriptive statistics by country (thousands of euros) 
 Mean Median Min Max 
ITALY     
Board Variables     
1. Board size 9.87      9 4 18 
2. Number of 
independent directors 6.06 6  1 16 
3. Number of 
executive directors 1.64    1          1 6 
4. Number of 
independent directors 
scaled by board size 0.60 0.70 0.01 0.89 
5. Number of 
executive directors 
scaled by board size 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.56 
6. CEO duality 0.23 0.00           0 1 
Financial Variables 
(thousand euro)     
7. Total Assets 19,826,570 4,306,183 144,828 1.54*108 
8. Market 
capitalization 12,496,678 2,161,580 43,121 93,776,560 
9. Tobin’s Q 1.16    1.14 0.78 1.63 
     
SPAIN     
Board Variables     
1. Board size 14 15 9 21 
2. Number of 
independent directors 6.47 6.50 0 12 
3. Number of 
executive directors 1.79 1 1 9 
4. Number of 
independent directors 
scaled by board size 0.44 0.45 0 0.80 
5. Number of 
executive directors 
scaled by board size 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.64 
6. CEO duality 0.52 1.00 0 1 
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Financial Variables 
(thousand euro)     
7. Total Assets 22,382,384 10,672,920 35,661 88,095,060 
8. Market 
capitalization 12,634,784 8,637,600 42,664 50,708,580 
9. Tobin’s Q 1.37 1.36 0.91 1.87 
     
UNITED KINGDOM     
Board Variables     
1. Board size 8.83 9.50 4 14 
2. Number of 
independent directors 4.32 4 0 8 
3. Number of 
executive directors 3.45 3 0 6 
4. Number of 
independent directors 
scaled by board size 0.45 0.50 0 0.72 
5. Number of 
executive directors 
scaled by board size 0.39 0.40 0 1 
6. CEO duality 0.04 0 0 1 
Financial Variables 
(thousand euro)     
7. Total Assets 9,334,861 6,955,368 152.85 49,915,580 
8. Market 
capitalization 8,248,169 3,769,870 20,494.83     49,569,753 
9. Tobin’s Q 1.50 1.31 0.33 8.14 
     
FRANCE     
Board Variables     
1. Board size 12.34 13.50 3 23 
2. Number of 
independent directors 4.60 4 0 11 
3. Number of 
executive directors 1.50 1 0 6 
4. Number of 
independent directors 
scaled by board size 0.36 0.38 0 0.79 
5. Number of 
executive directors 0.22 0.07 0 1 
  20 
scaled by board size 
6. CEO duality 0.65 1 0 1 
Financial Variables 
(thousand euro)     
7. Total Assets 43,023,781 25,605,505 7,028 2.39*108 
8. Market 
capitalization 21,119,052 8,797,522 4,334 1.48*108 
9. Tobin’s Q 1.41 1.33 0.94 2.64 
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APPENDIX B  
Matrix correlation 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Board size 1.00        
2. Number of independent 
directors 0.67*** 1.00       
3. Number of executive 
directors -0.07 -0.13** 1.00      
4. CEO Duality 0.21*** 0.03 -0.33*** 1.00     
5. Log (Ebit) 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.07 0.01 1.00    
6. Log(Market Cap) 0.41*** 0.27*** 0.05 0.07 0.95*** 1.00   
7. Tobin’s Q -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.13** 0.08 1.00  
8. Annual Growth Rate -0.08 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.15*** 1.00 
Board Size is the number of members in the boardroom. CEO duality is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 0 otherwise. Log(Ebit) is the logarithmic 
transformation of Earning before taxes and interests and it is calculated by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. 
Log(Mktcap) is the logarithmic transformation of market capitalization, calculated as Market Price-Fiscal Period End * Common Shares Outstanding. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets. Annual Growth Rate is calculated as the difference between 
the logarithm of total assets at time t and the logarithm of total assets at time t-1..  
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